The India Way, S. Jaishankar

The rise of India will be a key theme of the 21st century. A natural result of India’s economic growth will be a growing influence on world events. The India Way, written by the Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar, provides unparalleled insight into the thought processes that underlie how an increasingly confident India will exercise its newfound influence on the world stage. As such, it is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of the global order.

India in a Turbulent World

The book is neatly separated into 8 chapters which each outline a fundamental feature of Jaishankar’s vision for Indian foreign policy. The first chapter, titled The Lessons of Awadh, cautions that too often in its past India had a self absorbed and disattached approach to international affairs, which led to disastrous results. He argues forcefully that in an era of immense geopolitical flux, punctuated by the sharp rise of a hostile China, India cannot afford the luxury of “strategic complacency”. He argues that as India rises, “it should not only visualize its interests with great clarity but also communicate them effectively”. This sets up the broader theme of the book – to outline India’s interests and use these as a foundation to formulate an Indian grand strategy. But to do this, India must be prepared to engage the world on all fronts. India’s vigorous participation in seemingly opposed multilateral institutions, like the SCO and the Quad, is an example of this multi-front approach. The foundation of Jaishankar’s thought is that to profit from its growing influence, India must have a clear understanding of what its interests are and an unwavering willingness to defend them through vigorous engagement on all fronts.

Following this, Jaishankar moves to address the most important shift in contemporary geopolitics – the greater retrenchment of the United States from the world. In a cheeky nod to Donald Trump, in many ways the symbol of American retrenchment, this chapter is called The Art of the Disruption. To set the scene, Jaishankar observes with wit that “for two decades, China had been winning without fighting, while the US was fighting without winning”. This sets up the foundational dynamic for the contemporary era – the tense US-China relationship. This upheaval is behind the disruption of the post 1945 global order and a return to historical balance of power geopolitics, which Jaishankar notes warily creates “unstable equilibriums”.

In a world governed once again by national self-interest, India must be prepared to defend its own interests by all means. India must especially be on guard against rivals who seek to exploit “power differentials, economic advantages, and dependency of connectivity”, a thinly-veiled reference to India’s neighbour beyond the Himalayas. In this disrupted world “India cannot give any other nation a veto on its policy options”. Such realpolitik has been on full display with India maintaining good relations with Russia despite its invasion of Ukraine. Ultimately, Jaishankar argues that “India could rise in an incremental way, as it was hitherto wont to do…Or, it could be bolder and seek to determine agendas and outcomes”. In an increasingly disrupted world with multiple emerging power centres, India has a unique opportunity to craft a strategy which leads to “Many friends, few foes, great goodwill, more influence”.

A Cvilisational Foreign Policy

Having set the stage for the global state of affairs, Jaishankar turns to India’s civilisational cannon to draw inspiration for crafting a foreign policy to navigate a turbulent world. The third chapter, Krishna’s Choice, starts by observing that “Until recently, a Western paradigm has dictated global norms and values.” He cites China as the first non-Western power to draw on its cultural heritage to “project its personality and shape the narrative” and suggests India follow its example. I found this a really insightful parallel to draw, because being able to draw on cultural heritage is an ability somewhat unique to civilisation-states like India or China. Smaller nation-states like European ones can do it, but they bring the weight of only a local culture, while civilisation-states can use the culture of an entire civilisation to shape narratives. If India is to become a more active player on the global stage, I think it must become much more self confident and learn to take pride in its own heritage. Of course this must be kept far from blind jingoism, but feeling ashamed of its own civilisational heritage will bind India in a perpetual inferiority complex. This will strip it of agency on the global stage, even as it increasingly has the economic and military resources to project its own interests and shape the world.

In this vein, just as Europeans rightly take pride in the great works of their civilisation like the Illiad or – in a specifically strategic sense – Machiavelli’s The Prince, Jaishankar argues that Indians ought to draw inspiration from their own civilisational cannon. Indian strategic thought has traditionally been dominated by Kautilya’s Arthashastra, but Jaishankar instead suggests that “The Mahabharata is indisputably the most vivid distillation of Indian thoughts on statecraft”. While the Arthashastra is more like a manual for principles of governance, the Mahabharata is a “graphic account of real-life situations and their inherent choices'', which is more like the messy reality of international relations.

The bulk of the chapter is filled with examples from the epic to illustrate its relevance to statecraft. Foremost among these “relates to a determination to implement key policies without being discouraged by the collateral consequences of the action”. Any Indian will immediately map this onto Arjuna’s despair at having to fight his family on the battlefield at Kurukshetra and indeed that is exactly what Jaishankar evokes. He draws a parallel between Arjuna and the Indian state in that both can lack the will to do what needs to be done, despite having the resources to do so. For instance he laments that in the fight against terrorism, India is “often constrained by [its] lack of imagination and fear of risks”. Numerous other such examples from throughout the epic solidify its relevance to statecraft and hammer home Jaishankar’s argument that Indians must “rely on their own traditions to equip them in facing a tumultuous world”.

A Historical Report Card

Following this, Jaishankar gives an overview of India’s foreign policy since independence in order to be able to reflect on its successes and – perhaps more crucially – its failures. This chapter, intended to be an “honest introspection”, breaks India’s foreign policy into six phases. The first, from 1946 to 1962, is marked by “optimistic non-alignment” where India sought to preserve its strategic freedom from both the US and USSR. The defeat to China in 1962 marked the end of this idealistic period and initiated the second phase, which was a “decade of realism” where “India made more pragmatic choices”. This culminated in 1971 with the liberation of Bangladesh, which ushered in the third phase of “greater Indian regional assertion”. In addition to its role in the creation of Bangladesh, this period is also marked by other events like the unsuccessful Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war in the late 1980s. The major global shift during this time was the Pakistan brokered US opening to China, which created a US-Pakistan-China axis that “seriously threatened India’s prospects”. Finally, this era was ended by the dissolution of the USSR, India’s “close ally”, and the economic crisis of 1991 which threw Indian foreign and domestic policy into chaos.

The rise of the American unipolar moment started the fourth phase, where India attempted to engage the US while staunchly safeguarding its strategic autonomy. During this period, India also became a full nuclear weapons state in 1998 and had managed Pakistan’s “military adventurism” in the Kargil war. This, coupled with robust economic growth “opened new windows of opportunity for India”. The fifth phase is one where “India gradually acquired the attributes of a balancing power” as “Its relevance to the world increased”. India managed to improve relations with the US, as evidenced by the 2005 India-US nuclear deal, and also with other powers like China and Russia, for example through the fashioning of BRICS into a “major forum”. This somewhat rosy phase ultimately ended due to changes in both China and the US. As China gathered momentum, “the terms of engagement it offered to the world progressively hardened”. On the other hand, the US became increasingly withdrawn due to fatigue from its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. More structural factors, like the 2008 economic crisis and global economic rebalancing also contributed to a “wider dispersal of power and more localized equations”.

The bulk of the chapter is an in-depth assessment of each of these six eras and their successes and failures. Jaishankar concludes that overall India’s performance over seven decades “presents a mixed picture”. While economic progress has been impressive, it is “sobering” to consider what China has done in the same period. Overall, I agree with his assessment that an idealistic foreign policy driven by “unchanging … axioms” discouraged “an honest review of our performance and the introduction of timely correctives”. Once again, the call is for a disattached foreign policy driven by national interests. For Jaishankar, “A nation that has the aspiration to become a leading power … cannot be dogmatic in approaching a changing global order”. It must be perceptive to identify opportunities in a turbulent world and bold enough to take the risks to seize them.

Mandarins and Masses

In chapter 5, Jaishankar focuses on broader public opinion and how the “passions of society” interact with the “measured deliberations of statecraft”. In an environment of increasing nationalism across the world, he argues that “Mandarins can no longer be impervious to the masses”. He identifies three main drivers of nationalism. Firstly, the economic rise of nations like China and now India naturally elevates self confidence and national sentiment. Manifestations of this include a “demand for fairer representation like the IMF” and “the creation of new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” to assert their newfound power. Secondly, nationalism in the West is motivated primarily by a relative economic decline which has catalysed resentment and protectionism. Finally, he notes that “sharper cultural identities” around the world have also contributed to greater nationalism.

India of course has not been oblivious to these trends and Jaishankar does not shy away at all from accepting that nationalism has become more robust in India as well. One core element of Indian nationalism is a deep historical mistrust of the West, rooted in the colonial era. He makes a very strong argument that while the Chinese often invoke a century of humiliation, India “saw two – not one – centuries of rape and pillaging by Europe”. Yet despite this, it truly is remarkable that “Indians bear little grudge”. I see the Indian willingness to not get bogged down by the ghosts of the past as a great illustration of a realist foreign policy. As Jaishankar notes “The European Union, the UK, and the US are among the top economic partners and sources of capital, technology … necessary for India’s modernization”. At the same time however, India must not shy away from standing firm on its own interests. Shashi Tharoor, of the opposition Congress Party, has often said that Indians should forgive colonial depredations but never forget them, and this realist foreign policy appears to be a good implementation of that philosophy. India should not obstruct its own economic growth for the sake of historical injustice, because economic growth is the key factor in correcting those injustices and securing India’s rightful place on the world stage.

The Challenge of China

In chapter 6, we finally get to contemporary India’s most pressing foreign challenge – how to deal with a China ready to assert itself after the most spectacular economic rise in history. As he often does, here too Jaishankar begins with a historical overview of the India-China relation to provide appropriate context. Of course there are ancient civilisational connections, but the most relevant portions are after the crystallisation of these civilisations into modern civilisation-states after 1947 and 1949. The 1950s were generally marked by an optimism fueled by postcolonial bonhomie. However, the idealistic spirit of postcolonialism could not survive the realist pressures of a disputed border, and the 1962 Sino-Indian war conclusively ended this phase. Jaishankar concludes that “The loser in the 1962 conflict was not just India but the relationship itself.” Other issues, such as India’s giving refuge to the Dalai Lama, also set the stage for a greater deterioration. The other great negative force on India-China relations was China’s support for Pakistan, of which the most important manifestation has been China’s aid in Pakistan’s nuclear program. As he has done elsewhere, he ruefully notes how India’s idealism blinded it to the danger brewing in its neighbourhood. He observes that “If India did not see this coming when it first did, it could only be in allowing the first principles of balance of power to be clouded by nobler goals of a better world”.

The late 1970s and 1980s saw a thawing of relations, but by the 1990s the diverging economic performance of the two countries began to have a toll. As China’s economy expanded, so did its role in the world. Nevertheless, for most of the 1990s and 2000s China remained relatively subdued. Jaishankar identifies 2009 as “the turning point in China’s current rise”, as the “combination of a global financial crisis, a change in the US Administration, and the consequences of the Iraq war now no longer made it necessary to hide”. This creates the current context in which to see Indo-Chinese relations. For example, the Indo-Chinese border dispute in the Himalaya – the critical issue in recent years – should be seen in the context of a broader trend of Chinese assertiveness (or perhaps aggression) in the South and East China Sea. China’s economy being 5x India’s further complicates the situation as India is deeply reliant on China. The larger economy also helps China wield influence across India’s neighbourhood in countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. This asymmetry skews the balance heavily in China’s favour. To be sure, there are areas of potential cooperation – such as building new multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – but these appear to be few and far between in a tense relationship.

Jaishankar offers a sober, realism filled assessment of India’s position vs China noting that “whatever political rhetoric in our country suggests…there are gaps in their [India’s and China’s] comprehensive national power”. It’s an obvious statement but it’s very reassuring to see that India’s Minister of External Affairs has not been swayed by his need to pander to the patriotism of his electorate. Despite the imperative of fighting elections, he is unafraid of assessing the situation as it is and sharing his assessment openly. In conclusion, he argues that India has historically skewed to optimism and globalism in its relations with China to its disadvantage. Instead, this relationship should have been one built on realism and bilateralism. India’s strategic posture has historically been analogous to “playing black” in chess, i.e. playing from behind. Nevertheless, just as in chess, there are ways to imaginatively create latitude for those playing from behind, and that should be the mindset with which Indian policymakers approach China.

India’s Key Asian Partners: ASEAN and Japan

The China challenge has caused problems for multiple Asian powers beyond just India. Chief among these is Japan, which has its own border disputes and deep complicated economic and cultural linkages with China. Japan and India, historically remote, today have a unique confluence of interests which Jaishankar argues could be expanded into a fruitful partnership. He says that while “Neither India nor Japan had historically focused on each other…they both think similarly on the big issues of the day, especially in the last few years.” Historically, postcolonial India was more occupied with the West. For much of this period, while India and Japan had a “very cordial” relation, it was also one that was “low on ambition and high in rhetoric”.

Following the 1991 Look East Policy, “the centre of gravity for India has shifted much more to the East”, primarily through developing relations with ASEAN and Japan. With a shift in mindset and willpower, more concrete progress has followed. Jaishankar argues that “The real value of Japan lies in its well-earned reputation as the great modernization leader in Eurasia”, and cultivating the Indo-Japanese relationship would help India significantly in its own modernisation. As part of this, he advocates for greater economic linkages, which to me seems like unglamorous but smart and sensible policy. Beyond just economic connections though, Jaishankar notes the increasing political engagement. Japan and India are both part of the Quad (with Australia and the US) and there are other formal government linkages as well. The two have also engaged in joint military exercises, which I found very notable considering how history has held both India – with its lofty postcolonial globalist ideals – and Japan – with its war guilt from WWII – back from strengthening their militaries. Jaishankar also argues that India has a lot to learn from how Japan has always “leveraged the international environment” and “found partners to improve its position”.

The India-Japan partnership is far from realising its full potential, and Jaishankar argues that “India and Japan in particular have a gulf of mindsets to cross”. This will require “a strong sense of purpose backed by sustained efforts”. However, if “Noida and Nagoya are to truly meet, it would add a new page to Asia’s history”. There seems to be a historic opportunity available, and Jaishankar’s foreign ministry will put its full weight behind chasing it.

India’s Indo-Pacific Destiny

The India-Japan relation exists within the broader context of the Indo-Pacific. This region, stretching from California to Arabia, is “unquestionably the arena for the contemporary version of the Great Game”, because this is where all the economic growth and military power will be sourced in the 21st century. As usual, Jaishankar gives a historic appraisal, noting that the Indian and the (western) Pacific Ocean have always been one coherent entity as exemplified by merchant flows from Arabia all the way to East Asia. Never to hesitate poking fun at the West or Europeans, Jaishankar cheekily notes that “The British Empire operated its own version of the Indo-Pacific that was neither free nor open” at the peak of its power. The British gave way to the Americans as the global hegemon, and “just as the dominance of the US undid [the] Indo-Pacific after 1945, American adjustments now can help reinvent it”. Other processes contributing to its resurgence include “the ambitions of China, the interests of India, the posture of Japan, the confidence of Australia, and the awareness of the ASEAN”. The book is full of cute but empty-ish rhetorical phrases like this since it was created in part by stitching together public speeches and lectures that Jaishankar gave, but his point is clear. The presence of multiple rising powers gives this region a unique salience.

Despite occupying prime real estate in the Indo-Pacific, India’s maritime ambitions have been historically underwhelming. While the Pacific certainly presents opportunities, Jaishankar believes that “where India can really make a difference is in the Indian Ocean itself”. Here, India ought to maintain “a strong posture” and become a net provider of security. By doing so, “India’s value rises and ensures a more enthusiastic welcome further East”. I like the idea of focusing on your immediate neighbourhood where your strengths are. As India’s economy develops it can pursue opportunities in the Pacific more robustly but its ambitions must start from its neighbourhood. In addition to security, he also argues that a key goal should be “the revival of the Indian Ocean as a community that builds on its historical and cultural foundations”. Making the Indian Ocean region more cooperative will give India a good platform off of which to influence events in the broader world. In this vein, he picks the “re-energizing of SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation]” as a key priority, although he does acknowledge that this will face “determined opposition…from one country”, namely Pakistan. Other initiatives would include other less ambitious multilateral bodies like BIMSTEC and deeper bilateral cooperation with states like the Maldives and Seychelles. Ultimately, “the ethos of the Indian Ocean is a consultative one” so projects which are “people-centric initiatives” are likely to be sustainable. With the emphasis on consultative multilateralism, Jaishankar is drawing a clear distinction with China’s unilateral Belt and Road Initiative.

Ultimately, India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is a “free, open and inclusive region that [had] South-East Asia… at its centre…underpinned by a belief in a common rules-based order”. It’s worth noting that this is essentially the articulation by every state except China, as characterised by that ever pervasive “free, open” epithet. This highlights India’s convergence of values with other countries like the United States, Japan, and Australia. India envisions an Indo-Pacific that is “consultative, democratic and equitable” but must find a way to express its views more clearly. As it grows in economic power, India will no doubt have ample opportunity to leave its imprint on both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The India Way offers unparalleled insight into the internal workings of the world’s most important rising power. Jaishankar’s core argument is that to benefit from its economic rise, India must have a confident and realist foreign policy that isn’t beholden to lofty ideals which in the past have been disconnected from India’s actual national interests. Using history as a guide, he identifies ways to manifest the Jaishankar doctrine in all of India’s most important external relations from the US, to China, to the Indo-Pacific. Anyone interested in how geopolitics will evolve in the 21st century must gain an appreciation for India and how it will assert its own growing influence. Written by India’s External Affairs Minister, The India Way offers the deepest possible window into what type of world India envisions. I thoroughly recommend this book not just for Indians, but for anyone interested in the broad trajectory of the 21st century.