Easternisation, Gideon Rachman

Easternisation’s core argument is that the rise of Asia is bringing the “West’s domination of world politics … to a close”. Published in 2016 right after the election of Donald Trump, this book highlights how economic development in Asia, most importantly China, and simultaneous decline in the West have set the stage for a transformation of the international balance of power. Even six years after its publication, Gideon Rachman’s analysis appears to be a prophetic harbinger of an increasingly turbulent world.

The book is split into two dominant themes. The first, “Easternisation in Asia”, takes the reader on a tour of Asia to assess the impact economic development has had on the capabilities and aspirations of the most important Asian countries. In these sections, Rachman explores how the fundamental shift in economic power has shaped the grand ambitions of not only China, but also of Japan, South Korea, India, and the Southeast Asian countries. He also analyses how these ambitions contribute to an increasing instability that threatens to “convulse the world with fresh conflict” as newly rising Asian countries begin to assert themselves. The parallel that this evokes for me is Europe at the turn of the 20th century, full of ambitious and ascendant states such as Britain and Germany which also led to tremendous instability.

The most important force behind Easternisation is the rise of China, so it’s very appropriate that Rachman opens the book considering the sharp changes in Chinese ambitions following its economic ascent. China’s long standing doctrine of “hide and bide”, first espoused by Deng Xiaoping, seems to have ended with the ascent of Xi Jinping in 2012. Rachman notes how the Chinese have become more belligerent in this period. An early sign of this was escalation of the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands dispute in February 2013 when a Chinese frigate locked its missile-guidance system on a Japanese frigate in the vicinity of the islands for the first time. Simultaneously, the Global Times – a mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China – warned that “The possibility that China-Japan frictions will escalate into military conflict is growing”. Rachman also notes how Xi’s new foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, issued a “blunt warning to other Asian nations to not get above themselves in their … territorial disputes with China”. Such aggressiveness has only intensified in the years since this book’s publishing with Chinese militarisation of islands and coral reefs in the South China Sea and its deadly border clash with India in 2020.

A key force behind this assertiveness is growing Chinese nationalism. Rachman traces this to 1989 when the Tiananmen Square protests jolted the Communist Party into a brutal crackdown. To ensure this never happened again, one of the steps was to propagate the idea that China had undergone a “century of humiliation” from the First Opium War in 1839 until the Communist Party saved China in 1949. This leads to notions of the West’s unjustified dominance and how China’s rightful place is at the centre of the world order, as it had been for centuries before. Colonel Liu Mingfu writes in his book The China Dream that “It has been China’s dream for a century to become the world’s leading nation” and that when this happens, “it will put an end to notions of Western superiority”. This notion was supported by Xi and spread rapidly in Chinese political culture, showing how it was supported by Chinese leadership. I don’t think there is much doubt that there was indeed a “century of humiliation”, but I think what Rachman might be suggesting is that Communist Party leaders might be cynically using it as a political tool to consolidate control.

The second factor, and in my opinion the most important one, is China’s growing wealth. In 2014, China became the world’s largest economy on PPP terms and there are Chinese giants like Alibaba competing with the corporate behemoths of the US. The quick Chinese recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the sluggish western response, further boosted Chinese confidence, as did its knowledge that it was one of the biggest creditors of the US. The historian Niall Ferguson has coined the term Chimerica to capture the unique Chinese-American economic equation where strong Chinese savings channeled into US treasury bonds funded American consumption by keeping American interest rates low. The idea that Chinese wealth is bankrolling American consumption must have certainly played a role in increased self-confidence. With this increased confidence came a greater haughtiness from Chinese diplomats. Rachman recalls how one British diplomat told him that China was the only country where he was told “What you have to remember is that you come from a weak and declining nation” – ouch.

A final factor behind growing Chinese assertiveness is Communist Party fears that the West is actively working to subvert its rule. Beijing’s greater heavy handedness in Hong Kong is a sign of this, as the many protests in the city heightened China’s fears of Western sponsored revolutions like those in the former Soviet republics and the Arab world. This trend has only continued with the Hong Kong national security law passed in June 2020 which outlawed many of the freedoms of the former colony. The role of American social media companies like Facebook and Google in helping activists organise these revolutions was also noted keenly in Beijing and no doubt contributed to their censure in China. This sentiment is well captured by Yan Guiren, China’s former education minister, who thundered that “Never let textbooks promoting Western values enter our classes”.

Rachman then takes a reader on a swing through the other key powers of Asia to assess how they are reacting to the process of Easternisation. He starts off by assessing America’s reaction, which matters since America is the dominant naval power in the Pacific and Indian oceans and hence in some non trivial sense an Asian power. He highlights how the Obama state department’s “pivot to Asia” was motivated largely by increasing Chinese power, noting that “Over the course of the Obama administration … America came increasingly to see China more as a rival than a partner”. This “pivot” involved a renewed focus on increasing cooperation with allies in the region to contain China.

This sets the stage for Rachman to explore the positions of other countries in Asia. He starts off with Japan and South Korea, which are both treaty bound US allies. The core issue facing Japan is China’s growing assertiveness, which is what led now former PM Shinzo Abe to push for at least limited Japanese remilitarisation. Abe would have ideally liked to “scrap” article 9 of the Japanese constitution – which renounces war – and make Japan a “normal” country but even modest changes in this direction prove difficult. A July 2015 law to ease restrictions on the military caused an uproar with the opposition walking out of parliament. Coupled with this remilitarisation push is an increasing accommodation towards Japan’s controversial history in WWII. For example, Abe made visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which commemorates Japanese war dead, including convicted war criminals. The growing Japanese assertiveness and nationalism is also causing tension in South Korea, another nominal ally under the US nuclear umbrella. For South Korea a remilitarised Japan more comfortable with its past evokes memories of the horrors of WWII. This creates an interesting tension between the two nominal allies who face the twin threats of North Korea and China. This is an example of how the fundamental shift of power is creating complicated strategic situations throughout Asia.

One of the biggest prizes in this competition for influence is South East Asia. This region, which has seen impressive economic growth in the past decades, has always been a battleground between great powers. Rachman uses the example of Singapore to illustrate the situation many Southeast Asian countries face. Singapore underwent incredible economic development and as part of this was careful to cultivate close economic links with both the US and China. As a result, it plays a delicate balancing act in its relationship with the two superpowers, which reflects the “uneasy balance of power in Asia” according to Rachman. While Singapore allows US combat ships to use its naval harbours, it is very careful to not alienate China on other issues such as its disputes with other Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea. In addition to growing economic clout, Southeast Asia is also vital due to its geography. The Strait of Malacca, which feeds the Port of Singapore from the Indian Ocean, carries about 80% of Chinese energy shipments. Thus if this strait is blockaded, it would be disastrous for China. This explains why the region is such an important interest for Beijing.

Rachman highlights that Southeast Asia lacks a coherent response to growing Chinese assertiveness. By themselves, the Southeast Asian countries are too small to have an impact but acting together would be a different matter. He notes how ASEAN, the single would-be political and economic union in Southeast Asia, is very divided when it comes to increasing Chinese assertiveness. For example Cambodia is usually supportive of China while Vietnam is typically opposed to it. Rachman observes that “If ASEAN … were able to act as a determined and coherent bloc…it would be a powerful counterweight to Chinese influence… Yet, in reality, China found it relatively easy to find and exploit divisions within the bloc”.

The dark horse in this environment of greater competition in Asia is India, the would-be “second superpower” of the continent. Although many in the Indian elite are aware that India will probably not catch up to China for at least a generation if ever, the fast growth of the Indian economy and its promising demographics have allowed India to imagine owning the next few decades of global economic growth like China did in the past. This growth will naturally come with a greater say in world affairs. One of the issues Rachman brings up is India’s need to decide what role it will play in the world. Traditionally, India saw itself as a spokesman for the “Global South”, i.e. the formerly colonised nations. It did so through bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement and signed a treaty with the anti-colonialist USSR in 1971. As Rachman wrote in 2016, India was beginning to consider a stronger friendship with the US, putting its long standing relationship with Russia in tension. Now, in 2022, the two countries maintain a robust partnership in the wake of their divergent positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, showing how strong the relationship has become since this book was published. However, India’s refusal to formalise its partnership with the US via a treaty, like its fellow Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners Japan and Australia, shows India’s strong desire to maintain strategic autonomy.

Rachman also highlights the importance of India’s relationship with China. Many in Delhi believe that China is bolstering Pakistan to keep India bogged down. Chinese investments in Pakistan reached $46 billion in 2015, far outweighing anything the Americans had contributed during the “war on terror”. Crucially, the projects China financed had “a direct strategic pay-off for Beijing – and posed an indirect strategic threat to India and the US”. An example is the Chinese operated Gwadar port on the Pakistan coast, which would connect China to Middle Eastern oil overland and avoid the Malacca dilemma. Indeed, China is constructing ports all across the Indian ocean in a constellation known as the “string of pearls” wrapped around India. In response, India is increasing its own engagement across the region and investing in its own naval capabilities. Rachman observes that India’s determination to upgrade its navy is “a hedge against the possibility that… American power in Asia may decline”. A further key issue causing tensions between the two giants is their disputed border in the Himalaya, the longest in the world. This issue has only worsened since Rachman wrote his book following the 2020 skirmish between the Indian Army and People’s Liberation Army, which was the deadliest in decades and has left relations frozen between the two countries.

Finally, Rachman observes that as India grew in economic terms, it was “being courted on all sides”, with visits from Obama, Abe, and even Xi. It appeared then to Rachman that “as China rose, so India, Japan and the United states were drawing perceptibly closer together.” In 2022, India has been courted even more ardently on all fronts following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, yet it appears that it seems to have subtly made its choice by joining the Quad partnership with Japan, the US, and Australia against an even more assertive China. As the Indian economy grows in its own right, the relationship between India and China, the world’s third and first economies already in PPP terms, may come to be the second most important bilateral relationship in the world.

The second section of the book is focused on “Easternisation beyond Asia” and studies weakening of the Western led order. This portion starts off by assessing the weakening of American power globally. Jaded by the lives and treasure lost in wars in the Middle East Americans have lost their appetite for military engagement around the globe. Rachman observes that there is a “striking” decline in American naval power and that overall, “American defence spending was decreasing as a share of the economy”, trends that have continued since 2016 despite growing global turbulence.

Rachman argues that another factor contributing to Americans’ growing reluctance is the disproportionate burden they have had to contribute to NATO, which is a general symptom of Europe’s lack of leadership. Given that European military capabilities have undergone a relative decline as Europe outsourced its defense to the US, Europe has lost much of its agency as a strategic actor. Germany, the leading economy of the region, is unwilling to exercise any military leadership due to its past. France, while willing to deploy military force to regions such as its former colonies in West Africa, is simply incapable of exerting global influence on a significant level. In 2013 the French foreign minister himself noted that “Nobody can take over from the Americans from a military point of view”.

Another key reason for European weakness is economic stagnation, with debt crises in the Eurozone making significant military spending very difficult. In the 20th century, when America’s interests were firmly in preventing Soviet expansion, Europe could afford to outsource its defense like this. In the 21st century, when the most pressing challenges are in East Asia, this appears more difficult. While in 2022 the US has contributed the vast majority of military aid to Ukraine – far more than any European country – there have been questions of whether this is a distraction from the clear primary theatre of conflict/competition in Asia. Personally, I believe that due to continued economic stagnation and inability to project power, Europe will become a sideshow in the 21th century much like Asia was in the 20th.

Next the book moves onto challenges the Western order faces outside of Asia. The main examples include growing Russian assertiveness, which has been spectacularly reconfirmed six years after this book was published with Russia’s invasion in 2022. In addition to this, Rachman identifies other issues such as increasingly illiberal governments in places like Hungary (a member of the EU) and Turkey (a member of NATO). Finally, Rachman discusses growing Chinese influence in Africa and Latin America due to its greater economic strength and investment.

Rachman finishes off the book by highlighting what he perceives to be the West’s “institutional advantage”. I had thought this would be some intrinsic argument as to why liberal democracy is fundamentally a more durable form of governance or something like that. To some degree, Rachman did note how the Western countries enjoy better living standards which offers a significant soft power advantage. However I was disappointed to see that one of the key themes of this chapter focused on using the West’s domination of global institutions that it created in the last century to continue propping itself up. He notes how barring Iran from Swift meant that “At a stroke, Iran was cut off from the global financial system” and that “Within months, the Iranian economy was suffocating – forcing … major concessions … [Iran’s] nuclear program”. Rachman argues that Western institutions retain a fundamental “rule of law” that remains the most concrete guarantee of fair treatment, making them preferable to rival institutions founded by countries such as China. I believe that this is a disingenuous position. It is true that Chinese institutions are not as accountable as Western ones, because they are controlled by an autocracy but it is false to assume that Western institutions are somehow perfectly accountable. Rachman’s own assertion that the West can use its control of institutions such as Swift, the World Bank, and ICANN to assert its influence is evidence of this. We must credit Rachman since this point foreshadows the West’s blocking Russia out of global finance for its invasion of Ukraine. But it must also be seen that this was done unilaterally without consulting either China or India. In this case, such a drastic penalty was probably warranted but what cannot be denied is the absence of an effective multilateral process to make this decision. This opens a dangerous slippery slope and shows how Western institutions are not paragons of accountability. I find this argument of “institutional advantage” like a last desperate resort of a declining West. If this is the main advantage the West retains, then the decline of the West is far more advanced than I thought it was.

Overall, I thoroughly enjoyed reading Easternisation. I really liked how Rachman illustrated the process of Easternisation through his analysis of the capabilities and ambitions of the key Asian players. This was contrasted with an explicit demonstration of the challenges faced by Western powers, which made the shift even more clear. I was, however, disappointed by his argument on the West’s institutional advantage. While controlling global financial rails is clearly advantageous, unilaterally shutting out entire populations from global finance for the actions of their unaccountable and dictatorial governments doesn’t particularly feel like a win for the ideals of liberal democracy. It feels like a desperate last resort Machiavellian tactic to retain relevance in a world rapidly slipping away under your feet. Regardless of this, one cannot ignore that much of his analysis – including his point about controlling institutions – has been proven very right in the years since he published this book. For this reason, I would definitely recommend this book to anyone trying to get a sense of why the world is so turbulent today and where it might be headed in the decades to come.